

Recalibrating the War on Terror by Enhancing Development Practices in the Middle East

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Abstract

This research paper suggests that the cart has been placed before the horse, that democratization and open markets in the Middle East are more likely the result of effective development than the catalyst for it. The war on terror has been justified by the United States as an effective means of reducing the possibility of terrorist attacks. This paper analyzes the validity of those justifications by reviewing the linkage between democracy and economic growth and that between democracy and peace.

The paper begins by hypothesizing that the war on terror and forced democratization of the Middle East are leading to increased terrorist attacks against foreign targets. The analysis suggests that effective development programs in non-democratically oriented countries, such as those in the Middle East, tend to promote democratization and that when the reverse procedure is applied through the use of force, the result is often destructive both for long-term development prospects and for peaceful relations with the intervener.

The central research question this paper intends to answer is whether U.S. efforts at forced democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan are a central cause of increased terrorist activity against foreign targets and, if so, whether a more effective strategy would be to enhance development procedures that tend to foster democratic values and facilitate long-term, sustainable democratic growth.

I. Introduction

Terrorism has existed in various forms for hundreds of years. Only recently, with the attacks on the United States, Spain and the United Kingdom, has the awareness of terrorism in the Western world intensified. And while attacks considered terrorist-based occur on a surprisingly frequent basis, these three attacks stand out prominently as the starting point for a new era in global relations.

Terrorist attacks are detrimental to the target local as well as the global political, financial and social economy. Such attacks increase insecurity, resulting in higher transaction costs due to increased risk and more public funds being diverted to national defense. Accordingly,

identifying methods to secure a reduction in the frequency of such attacks is in the best interests of all States that benefit from the global economy.

The United States was attacked in 2001 by a group of terrorists hailing largely from Saudi Arabia. The alleged mastermind of the attack, Osama bin Laden, was said to be stationed in Afghanistan shortly thereafter. In retaliation for the attack, the United States sought United Nations Security Council approval for sanctions and subsequent military intervention to find and extradite bin Laden to the United States for trial.

The United States' invasion of Afghanistan was authorized by the United Nations and began in 2002, leading to the overthrow of the Taliban government. Bin Laden was not found in Afghanistan. In a collateral effort to democratize the country, the United States led the implementation of a new government in Afghanistan to fill the void left by the removal of the Taliban.¹ Combat operations continue to this day in Afghanistan as pro-Taliban forces attempt to regain ruling power.

In 2003, the United States intensified efforts to reduce the risk of terrorist attack by preemptively striking targets in Iraq under the belief that Iraq was harboring nuclear weapons and possibly Al Qaeda terrorists. Unlike the war in Afghanistan, international support was severely limited for this invasion. After invading, the United States captured the former leader, Saddam Hussein, and again implemented a new form of government to rule Iraq.

The U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan and Iraq have been justified by the current administration as necessary measures to reduce terrorism.² This justification gives rise to several important questions. Is military intervention in the Middle East the most effective method for reducing the possibility of terrorist attacks? Are efforts at regime change in the Middle East

¹ See, e.g., MARTIN LIPSET, *THE DEMOCRATIC ADVANTAGE* (2005).

² See George W. Bush, *Speech on Promoting Democracy*, Oct. 25, 2004, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/7472/speech_on_promoting_democracy.html

decreasing the number of terrorist attacks on foreign targets? And, is forced democratization an effective and sustainable method for curtailing terrorist attacks?

This research paper begins with an exploration of the literature surrounding the U.S.-led war on terror. The literature review examines justifications for the war by considering the claim that democratization yields economic development and then examining whether there is a link between forced democratization and a reduction in terrorism. The next section sets forth the research questions to be answered in the analysis of this literature and data. Section IV briefly describes the methodology to be used in answering the research questions. Section V analyzes at length the assertions that democracy is related to a reduction in terrorism and to economic growth. Finally, the paper concludes that the war on terror is leading to an increase in the number of terrorist attacks against foreign targets and that effective sustainable development practices would be more effective in curtailing terrorist proliferation.

II. Literature Review

a. Linkage between democracy and economic growth

Current foreign policies in the West have not often verbally recognized the need for greater work toward democracy in the Middle East. President Bush recently spoke at the United Nations on this point, claiming that democracy “requires building the institutions that sustain freedom.”³ Yet the freedom that he speaks of is the same freedom he contends will “change the conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit”.⁴ This link, between spreading democracy and suppressing terrorism, is a major justification for the war being waged in the Middle East.

³ See George W. Bush Speech to United Nations (Sept. 14, 2005).

⁴ *Id.*

The democratization process in the early United States, largely an internal rather than external process, evolved over a long period of time and involved numerous challenges to its efficacy.⁵ Substantial inequalities among states, a civil war, and discriminatory voting practices in U.S. history make it clear that democracy does not develop easily. Rejections of democracy from Iraq to Venezuela to Indonesia are a reflection of the fact that the benefits of democracy are often delayed beyond the threshold of citizen patience. Amy Chua of Yale Law School finds that the basis for this disenchantment may lie in the fact that the market democracy promoted by the West is not the same as that practiced by the West.⁶

David Gillies reviewed the evidence supporting linkages between democracy and development and found it “ambiguous, at best.”⁷ He found that rather than democracy promotion, encouraging good governance could yield more productive results for development:

If the relationship between democracy and economic development is empirically open-ended and indirect, at best, then donors may need to consider how their democracy, rights and governance programs are justified. Instead of an “all good things go together” approach, donors could consider less lofty approaches that focus on the enabling conditions for growth and development. These include promoting accountability, transparency, and a predictable set of rules to govern economic interactions and public policy.⁸

Fareed Zakaria contends that democracy is a long-term process within which results should not be anticipated in the initial stages. He defines democracy as the process of selecting governments and constitutional liberalism as the protection of liberty through rule of law.⁹ This is a critical distinction. According to Zakaria, freedom to act and protection from authoritarian government results not from the democratic process but rather from the institutions that give rise

⁵ See, The People’s Road: American Democracy, The Economist book review (Oct. 29, 2005).

⁶ See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003).

⁷ DAVID GILLIES, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (IRPP Policy Matters, 21) (April 2005).

⁸ *Id.* at 24.

⁹ FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM (2004).

to “constitutional liberalism”, which he defines as including traditional democratic values as well as individual liberty, rule of law, and freedom from coercion, among other things.¹⁰

Elections have been held in both Afghanistan and Iraq since the U.S. intervened. The high voter turnout and seemingly legitimate process was hailed by the international community as a success. But do elections signify stability or progress? Jane Boulden contends that “[e]lections act as a functional indication of a milestone in the peace process, providing the international community with evidence of change. They are not, however, reliable indicators of real progress, in either democratization or the establishment of peace.”¹¹

Terry Lynn Karl at Stanford suggests that without the “liberalization of authoritarian rule”, creation of a civil society, and the holding of fair elections of uncertain outcome, elections alone do not constitute a sign of regime change. “Equating democracy with the mere holding of elections or assuming that such elections will subsequently generate further and deeper democratic reforms down the line commits ‘the fallacy of electoralism’.”¹² Referring to Zakaria’s notion of illiberal democracies, Karl warns that “excessive minimalism”, including superficial changes in leadership, new constitutions and policies, and elections, may in fact be simply a shift from one type of autocracy to another.¹³

Francis Fukuyama briefly examines the linkage between democracy and economic development by comparing once popular ideas of rigid, authoritarian institutional reforms with modern movements toward democracy “as the object of development in itself and a means

¹⁰ Fareed Zakaria, *The Rise of Illiberal Democracy*, For. Aff. (Nov. 1997) (defining constitutional liberalism as “...the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source -- state, church, or society. The term marries two closely connected ideas. It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberty. It is constitutional because it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”)

¹¹ Jane Boulden, *Democracy and Peace-Building*, IRPP Policy Matters at 43 (April 2005).

¹² Terry Lynn Karl, *From Democracy to Democratization and Back: Before Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, CDDRL Working Papers No. 45 at 7 (Sept. 2005).

¹³ *Id.* at 8.

toward economic growth.”¹⁴ Fukuyama finds that democratic countries often perform better through political and economic crises due to greater legitimacy and stability; however, he finds a weak empirical relationship between democracy and development, arguing that there is little support for either authoritarian or democratic rule as consistent with growth.¹⁵

Mahmood Monshipouri suggests that democracy is not only disconnected from economic development, but that it also may lead to worsening economic situations. Examining the deregulation and privatization of firms in Latin America, for example, Monshipouri contends that poverty has increased, inequalities have grown wider, and crime has risen as a result of democracy.¹⁶

Arunabha Bhounik, writing in the *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy*, recently postulated that the war on terror is ignoring the underlying causes of terrorist proliferation and thereby “exacerbating the terrorist threat.”¹⁷ These underlying causes are certainly worth examining,¹⁸ but the key to understanding why terrorist activity continues to intensify may have more to do with the exacerbating factors of military intervention, which could aggravate those base factors.

b. Forced Democratization and Terrorist Proliferation

Jason Brownlee of the Stanford Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, contends that forced democratization and foreign state building fail to recognize the rigidity

¹⁴ See Francis Fukuyama, *STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY*, at 28.

¹⁵ See Francis Fukuyama, *STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY*, at 28.

¹⁶ Mahmood Monshipouri, *Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating Developing Countries*, 4 *Yale H.R. & Dev. L.J.* 25, 31 (2001).

¹⁷ *Bhounik* at 286.

¹⁸ See, e.g., Kevin J. Fandl, *Terrorism, Development & Trade: Winning the War on Terror Without the War*, 19 *Am. J. Int’l L.* 587 (2004).

of local institutions and the potentially detrimental responses of locals.¹⁹ Using the example of American intervention in Central America, Brownlee points out that military intervention failed to develop a single true democracy in the region – only Costa Rica democratized and the U.S. never intervened there.²⁰ Brownlee concludes that in order for foreign-intervention to succeed, it must be “downsized not supersized.”²¹ He suggests that “[t]he failures of imposed regime change lead to the conclusion that indigenous gradual political development – with all of its potential for authoritarianism and civil unrest – could be the optimal path for sustainable democratization and statebuilding.”²²

In a comprehensive and thought-provoking new book, *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability*, Amy Chua of Yale University Law School postulates that free markets and democracy favor market-dominant minorities at the expense of competing ethnic groups, creating envious factions and hatred.²³ Interestingly, Chua draws attention to the fact that the type of democracy being promoted by the West is significantly distinct from the type of democracy that exists in developed countries today.²⁴ The long-term, often difficult democratization model utilized by the West has been replaced by the quick-fix package of democratization exported to many developing countries today. The sustainability of recent democratization efforts by the West remains to be seen.

F. Groegory Gause III recently argued in *Foreign Affairs* that the answer to the Middle East violence problem may not lie in immediate democratization but rather in long-term solutions that require regular U.S. assistance. He refers to the 2003 State Department Report,

¹⁹ Jason Brownlee, *Imperial Designs, Empirical Dilemmas: Why Foreign-Led State Building Fails*, 40 CDDRL Working Papers at 10 (June 16, 2005).

²⁰ Brownlee at 13.

²¹ Brownlee at 34.

²² Brownlee at 37.

²³ Chua at 9.

²⁴ Chua at 13.

Patterns of Global Terrorism, to conclude that over half of the 2003 terrorist attacks in non-free countries occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the heralding of recent elections in both of those countries.²⁵ He concludes that foreign intervention in its current manifestation may not be achieving its goal of reducing terrorist attacks.²⁶

Thomas Carothers suggests that the idea of democracy promotion as a solution to Islamic fundamentalism is “badly oversimplified and potentially misleading as a policy credo.”²⁷ He finds that the Middle East is generally skeptical of Western efforts to democratize their region and the leaders believe that “democracy would likely unleash radical forces that could be harmful to both the region and the West.”²⁸

The cultural makeup of the Middle East may also be contributing to the poor prospects for democratization and a reduction in violence against foreign forces. Jane Boulden argues that where a significant gap exists between an outsider, market-dominant minority and a poor, destitute majority, democratization can act as an opportunity for the poor to “take back” what is rightfully theirs. “Rather than being conducive to peace, therefore, democratization can contribute to conflict.”²⁹

Jennifer Moore argues that the problems of poverty and underdevelopment in the Middle East have been compounded by the war on terror and that the substantial reliance on military force as opposed to alternative means to fight terrorism “potentially feeds ongoing conflicts

²⁵ F. Gregory Gause III, *Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?*, For. Aff. (October 2005); *see also*, U.S. Dept. of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003* (April 2004).

²⁶ *Id.*

²⁷ Thomas Carothers, *Democracy's Sobering State*, Curr. Hist. 412 (December 2004).

²⁸ *Id.* at 416.

²⁹ *Boulden* at 36.

rather than repressing them.”³⁰ The poverty and underdevelopment that existed in the Middle East prior to recent foreign intervention may have been exacerbated by the military advance.

Some members of the international community, while supportive of U.S. efforts in the war on terror in many respects, believe that the war is actually increasing terrorism. A 2004 Pew Research Center study that interviewed French and German attitudes toward the war on terror found that a majority of people “believed that the Iraq war had undermined the struggle against terrorists and doubted the Bush Administration’s sincerity in trying to combat terror.”³¹ Lakdhar Brahimi, the United Nations Special Envoy to Iraq, stated in April 2004 that “there is no military solution to the problems [in Iraq], and that the use of force, especially the excessive use of force, makes matters worse and does not solve the problem.”³²

Daniel Benjamin, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and Steven Simon of Georgetown University, recently asserted that the U.S. invasion of Iraq increased the number of Jihadists, thereby increasing the long-term threat of terrorism.³³ “It is simply no longer possible to maintain that the United States is winning the war on terror.”³⁴ They find that military intervention is often a poor preventative measure against terrorism because the military is ill-equipped to address the modus operandi of terrorists.³⁵ The idea of democratizing the Middle East is good, they suggest, but it is unlikely to succeed without the social, economic and demographic conditions necessary for sustainability. They conclude that broad reforms and a stronger international coalition are the most effective solution to the current quagmire.

³⁰ Jennifer Moore, *Collective Security with a Human Face: An International Legal Framework for Coordinated Action to Alleviate Violence and Poverty*, 33 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 43, 43 (Winter 2004).

³¹ Susan Sachs, *Poll Finds Hardening Toward U.S. Policies*, N.Y. Times at A3 (March 17, 2004).

³² John F. Burns, *Iranians in Iraq to Help in Talks on Rebel Cleric*, N.Y. Times at A1 (April 15, 2004).

³³ DANIEL BENJAMIN AND STEVEN SIMON, *THE NEXT ATTACK* xiv (2005).

³⁴ *Id.* at 126.

³⁵ *Id.* at 198.

Democracies are few and far between in the Middle East.³⁶ Of the non-democratic countries, attempted transitions to democracy have largely resulted in a nebulous state between authoritarianism and democracy, where elections are often held with the winner already decided, partial privatization has been implemented, and gestures have been made to the international community.³⁷ In her recent book, *Terror in the Name of God*, Jessica Stern argues that democracy is not the most effective way to fight terrorism. To support this, she posits the examples of Algeria, where the Islamic party took power democratically after a drop in oil prices; Pakistan, where the Islamic party that considers the Talibanization of Pakistan a priority, took substantial parliamentary seats in the 2002 election as a result of the Pakistani government's support for the war on terror; and Turkey, where an Islamic party took 363 of the 550 parliamentary seats in the 2002 elections.³⁸ Stern concludes that these transitional democracies were unable to provide the anticipated benefits of a democracy for their citizens and, rather than curbing inequalities, democratic rule expanded them. Growth of Islamic fundamentalism could be seen as a logical outgrowth of this dissatisfaction.

Fighting this growth in Islamic fundamentalism might be more effectively done through enhanced development practices that allay these inequities, that provide the anticipated benefits of democracy, and that offer alternative outlets to voice grievances. Research suggests that citizens living within an autocracy, a faltering neo-liberal democracy, or a fragile developing

³⁶ According to the Freedom in the World 2005 index, of the 18 Middle Eastern countries identified in that index, 17 are partly or completely not free (Israel being the single exception). *Freedom in the World : Table of Independent Countries*, Freedom House, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf>.

³⁷ See, e.g., Carothers, UNCHARTED JOURNEY: PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, at 8, Fareed Zakaria, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM, at 98-99.

³⁸ JESSICA STERN, TERROR IN THE NAME OF GOD, 287-88 (2003).

democracy, that become disgruntled in large numbers due to failed social services and inequality, are more likely to explore non-democratic outlets for change, including terrorism.³⁹

Groups that target the West for their ills grow more powerful politically and economically as a result of this rise in dissatisfaction with democracy. Violent Western-led responses to their terrorist attacks against foreign targets have tended to increase support for terrorist groups. For instance, after the attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa led to a violent U.S. military response on targets in Sudan, terrorist groups rejoiced and began to band together, thereby increasing, rather than reducing their strength.⁴⁰

III. Research Questions and Hypothesis

While wars are often accompanied by elaborate plans of attack and engagement, as well as clear targets and goals, the war on terror is conspicuously absent of any of these.⁴¹ It might be said that the goal of the war effort is a significant reduction in terrorist activity, being that complete prevention is unrealistic. Reducing the possibility of terrorist attacks would certainly restore a layer of global security that has begun to evaporate. Accordingly, with this goal in mind, plans can be derived and measured in terms of how likely they are to achieve this goal. Recent efforts led by the United States to reduce terrorist proliferation have involved regime change, bombing campaigns, occupation, and most recently, forced democratization. How successful are these efforts at reducing the possibility of terrorist attacks? Are they having the intended impact on the target population?

³⁹ See, e.g., United Nations Economic and Social Council, Statement by Carlos Fortin (June 29, 2005), available online at <http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/meetings/2005/hl2005/Fortin.pdf>.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 289.

⁴¹ See, e.g., Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *THE NEXT ATTACK*, at 186-87.

The null hypothesis to be tested in this research paper can be stated as follows: forced democratization of the Middle East, that is, democratization accompanied by military or other threatening means (measured by type and level of Western involvement in the Middle East), will reduce the likelihood of terrorist attacks against foreign targets. Accordingly, a rise in the level of foreign involvement in the operation of a Middle Eastern State should result in a decreased number of terrorist attacks against foreign targets, either in the country of involvement or abroad.

In the alternative, this paper suggests that increased foreign military involvement in the Middle East is not positively correlated with a decreased number of terrorist attacks against Western targets. Further, based on the limited evidence gathered, this paper proposes that increased foreign military involvement in the Middle East is in fact leading to an increase in the likelihood of terrorist attacks on foreign targets.

This hypothesis will be tested by examining foreign engagement in the Middle Eastern region using statistical data primarily gathered from the World Bank, the U.S. Department of State, Freedom House and the National Counterterrorism Center.

IV. Methodology

Hostilities in the Middle East inhibit the collection of a comprehensive set of data to perform the analysis that this paper proposes. For example, a complete survey might include up to date levels of terrorist activity and proliferation across the Middle East, concentration of foreign troops across Iraq and Afghanistan, and updated numbers of foreign contractors operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, strong indicators can be drawn from existing data on levels of U.S. troop involvement in Iraq, number of terrorist attacks on foreign targets, and

number of significant regional attacks by Islamic terrorist organizations. These indicators enable reasoned conclusions to be drawn and related recommendations to be made.

Data expressing a linkage between terrorist activity and U.S. involvement in the forced democratization of the Middle East is calculated by comparing the number of terrorist attacks in all parts of the world led by Islamic militants as well as the level of coalition troop fatalities with the type and level of Western involvement during the period in which those attacks occurred. The resulting data show a significant rise in the number of worldwide terrorist attacks and coalition troop fatalities since the U.S.-led invasion and forced democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan.

V. Analysis and Results: Effective Development Practices in the Middle East

Throughout the Middle East, there is significant support for the idea that American-led imperialists are imposing their Western values, economics, and politics on an otherwise stable and peaceful society.⁴² In the U.S., the belief being espoused by the Bush Administration is that democratization is a necessary and lacking institution in the Middle East that will keep the West safe from terrorism.⁴³ Yet stories throughout Western newspapers report that terrorist attacks are on the rise and that the death toll in the “war on terror” is growing.⁴⁴ In the Middle East, tensions are growing rapidly and discontent with American occupation is leading new terrorist

⁴² See, e.g., Susan Sachs, *Poll Finds Hostility Toward U.S. Policies*, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2004 at 3 (discussing the recent Pew Research Center for the People and the Press poll showing a high degree of ill will and distrust for foreign intervenors in the Middle East); Stephen A. Cook, *The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform*, 84 For. Aff. 2 at 91 (Mar./Apr. 2005) (concluding that while democracy is welcomed in the Middle East, militarized delivery of democracy is resisted).

⁴³ See George W. Bush, *Speech on Promoting Democracy*, Oct. 25, 2004, available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/7472/speech_on_promoting_democracy.html (discussing the long-term security that will result from democratization of the Middle East).

⁴⁴ See Tom Regan, *Global Terror Attacks Tripled in 2004*, Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 2005 (discussing the dramatic increase in the number of terrorist attacks in 2004); see also, Michael A. Fletcher, *2000th Death Marked by Silence and a Vow*, Wash. Post., Oct. 26, 2005 at A13 (reflecting the more than 2,000 U.S. soldiers that have died in Iraq hostilities); Iraq Body Count, available at <http://www.iraqbodycount.net/> (suggesting that at least 26,000 people have died since the start of the Iraq war).

cells to emerge in response.⁴⁵ The question then becomes, is the U.S.-led effort to stunt terrorism with democratization having the reverse effect? Is the war on terror creating more terror?

a. Linkage between democracy and a reduction in terrorism

In Iraq, the Bush Administration openly pursued a strategy of “regime change” as their motivation for war because the regime was withholding necessary information on their nuclear weapons proliferation.⁴⁶ After invading and discovering no such weapons, fighting terrorism became the central focus. This was a logical next step since terrorists had largely overrun Iraq after the existing regime was removed and they stood in the way of the Administration’s efforts to establish a democratic system of governance.

The view taken by the U.S. that forced democracy will eliminate terrorism is limited in international support.⁴⁷ In the Arab world, ruling elites do not favor the use of democracy to eliminate Islamic extremism.⁴⁸ Thomas Carothers contends that the Arab world holds the view that democracy in the Middle East would “unleash radical forces that could be harmful to both the region and the West.”⁴⁹ Steven Cook posits that “democracy – imported at the tip of an m-16 rifle – is looking less and less appealing to many Arabs.”⁵⁰ The story is the same in the non-Arab world where support for the invasion was weak and support for the occupation weaker.⁵¹

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Mike Boettcher, *Al Queda Forming New Cells Worldwide*, CNN.com, July 31, 2002 (describing the spread of terrorist “super cells” across North Africa and Southeast Asia).

⁴⁶ John Yoo, *International Law and the War in Iraq*, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 3, 563 (2003).

⁴⁷ See, e.g., Yochi J. Dreazen, *U.N. Report Extols Democracy for Mideast but Criticizes U.S.*, Wall Street Journal at A4, Apr. 6, 2005 (discussing a recent U.N. report finding that democratic values are essential for the region but that the U.S. efforts are “complicating efforts to bring those values about.”)

⁴⁸ Carothers at 416.

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ Steven A. Cook, *The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform*, 84 For. Aff. 91 (Mar/Apr 2005).

⁵¹ See, e.g., Susan Sachs, “Poll Finds Hostility Hardening Toward U.S. Policies”, N.Y. Times at A3 (March 17, 2004).

Regime change is a goal that is distinct and incompatible with the goal of reducing terrorism. In order to achieve some semblance of success with regime change, an intervener must play party politics by working with the various social and ethnic groups within a country.⁵² This includes working with extremist groups that may find an outlet in the democratic process (at least initially). “Especially in violent settings, democracies are not built by democrats alone and they are not always built by democratic means.”⁵³ Poor strategic planning and coordination may result in an unsustainable democracy as well as a rise in terrorist activity.⁵⁴

More than two years have passed since Iraq was invaded and a stable, legitimate government has yet to be established. A constitution was prepared and an interim ruling parliament was elected, but these are merely icons of a system that has no roots in the Middle East. They are symbolic to the democratic world because they mirror staple democratic mechanisms in the West. However, these events, while important, are no indication of a sustainable, lasting, or peaceful democracy.

The level of foreign troop involvement in Iraq is reflective of the role that outsiders play in Iraqi daily life. U.S. troops patrolling streets and performing regular raids of potential terrorist locations give the image of the occupiers as in control of Iraqi security. Coalition troop levels have decreased slightly overall since the start of the war, although the number of U.S. troops has increased from 136,714 to 144,071.⁵⁵ The number of coalition troop fatalities has also increased since the start of the war, totaling over 2,000 to date (see Table 1, below).

⁵² See, e.g., Chua, *World on Fire* at 274 (arguing that the United States must not promote “unrestrained, overnight majority rule” where market dominant minorities exist but rather should ensure judicial and constitutional safeguards to allow for the gradual development of the democratizing country).

⁵³ *Karl* at 33.

⁵⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁵ Note that the number of coalition troops has remained approximately 23,000, while the number of U.S. troops has increased from 136, 714 to 144,071 since the start of the war in Iraq. See, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq*, The Brookings Institution (Aug. 29, 2005) at 17.

Table 1a: Terrorist attacks on and fatalities of coalition troops in Iraq by year (2003-2005)

IRAQ	2003	2004	2005
Troop Level (Coalition) ⁵⁶	170,000	162,000	161,500
Number of Fatalities ⁵⁷	579	905	827 ⁵⁸
Percent of total	0.34%	0.56%	0.51%

Table 1b: Terrorist attacks on and fatalities of coalition troops in Afghanistan by year (2003-2005)

AFGHANISTAN ⁵⁹	2002	2003	2004	2005
Troop Level (Foreign)	65,400	19,800	132,400	191,600
U.S. Military Fatalities	60	12	43	73
Percent of Total	.092%	.061%	.032%	.038%

Table 2: Number of Daily Attacks by Insurgents in Iraq by year 2003-2005⁶⁰

	July 2003	July 2004	July 2005
Number of Daily Attacks	16	47	70
Number of Coalition Fatalities	486	801	827
Average Number of Fatalities Per Attack	3.29	5.87	9.30

The table below represents the number of significant terrorist attacks annually from 1998 through 2004.⁶¹ In 2004, however, the Bush Administration chose to withhold this statistical information to prevent giving the image that the U.S. was losing the war on terror.⁶²

⁵⁶ See, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, The Brookings Institution (Aug. 29, 2005) at 17.

⁵⁷ See, Iraq Casualties, available at <http://www.iccasualty.org>.

⁵⁸ The most recent statistic for coalition fatalities, rather than U.S. only, available for 2005 fatalities (as of November 29, 2005) is published by iccasualty.org, which retrieves its data from the U.S. Department of Defense. <http://iccasualties.org/oif/>.

⁵⁹ See Afghanistan Index, The Brookings Institution (Sept. 15, 2005) at 5-6.

⁶⁰ See, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, The Brookings Institution (Aug. 29, 2005) at 20. Data for Afghanistan insurgent attacks is not currently available.

⁶¹ The actual number of total attacks is significantly higher (over 2,000 in 2004). Note that these numbers do not include the Iraqi civilians killed as a result of the war on terror, which the Brookings Institute estimates to be rising and around the level of 8,073 – 14,400 as of August 2005. See, Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq, The Brookings Institution (Aug. 29, 2005) at 10.

⁶² See, Susan B. Glasser, “U.S. Figures Show Sharp Global Rise in Terrorism”, Wash. Post A01 (April 27, 2005).

Congressmen subsequently pressured the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC) to release the actual 2004 statistics, which they did (see Table 3).

Table 3: Significant terrorist attacks 1998-2004⁶³

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Number of Attacks	274	395	426	355	205	208	655

Table 4: Terrorist attacks by region 1998-2003 (significant and non-significant)⁶⁴

	Africa	Asia	North America	Middle East	Western Europe	Eurasia	Latin America
1998-2003 Total Casualties	5,897	5,590	4,465	3,560	1,380	738	365
1998-2003 Total Attacks	174	468	6	208	222	93	692
1998-2003 Average Casualties Per Incident	34	12	744	17	6	8	1

The type of foreign involvement in the Middle East is highly indicative of the anticipated scope of response by opposition forces. Much of the major fighting in Iraq in 2002 shifted to market stabilization in 2003 and democratization in 2004-05. The U.S. led the establishment of a new Iraqi council in July 2003, which announced major market-oriented reforms in Iraq two months later.⁶⁵ Much of the year was spent stabilizing oil pipelines to spur production and subsequent export income for Iraq.⁶⁶ In November of that year, the U.S. took over the former United Nations Oil-for-Food program in Iraq. In 2004, the focus shifted toward the democratization of Iraq. June 2004 saw the official transfer of sovereignty from the U.S.

⁶³ This data is based on U.S. Department of State annual reports from 1998 through 2003.

⁶⁴ Data from U.S. State Department, *Patterns of Global Terror 2003*.

⁶⁵ See Speech by Undersecretary of the Treasury, John B. Taylor (Feb. 12, 2004) available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/pressreleases/20040212_taylor.html (discussing anticipated economic reform of Iraq's banking sector, currency, international debt and frozen assets).

⁶⁶ For a chronology of oil-related events in Iraq, see "Iraq Oil Chronology: 1980-April 2005" (Energy Information Administration, available at www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/iraqchron.html).

Coalition Provisional Authority to the interim Iraqi government. This event preceded the official election, held in January 2005.

The type of U.S. involvement in Iraqi affairs shifted from military engagement, to market stabilization (primarily through oil infrastructure protection), to democratic reform (through sovereignty transfer, elections, and the attempt to draft a Constitution). This process – from war to democracy – coincided with an increase in U.S. troop fatalities and an increase in worldwide terrorist attacks. While direct conclusions warrant substantially more data, which is currently unavailable due to the volatile situation in the region, a positive relationship can be seen between the type and level of involvement of foreign occupiers and the resulting level of terrorist activity.

Why Democracy Cannot Precede Effective Development in the Middle East

A central facet to a policy of forced democratization is immediate results. When Afghanistan held elections in 2004, the U.S. hailed this as a shining moment in their newly established democracy.⁶⁷ The same enthusiasm accompanied the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim authority in 2004 and elections in 2005.⁶⁸ But regardless of whether these steps are a sign of democratic reform, they most certainly are not a reflection of the establishment of a legitimate, sustainable democracy. Democracy takes time to grow and develop, much like any social change. The literature reviewed indicates that an approach that counts on rapid democratization through military force is more likely to experience substantial cost-overrun and extended periods of engagement in the host country than is an approach that fosters sustainable development while planting the seeds of democracy.

⁶⁷ See, e.g. Leta Hong Fincher, Voice of America at (Dec. 9 2004) (hailing the Afghanistan elections as a triumph of freedom).

⁶⁸ See, e.g. Michael White and Ian Black, Iraq: The Handover: Bush and Blair in Sync as NATO Told of Transfer, The Guardian (London) at 4 (June 29, 2004), Peter Baker and Robin Wright, “In Iraqi Vote, White House Sees Vindication Of Its Course, Wash. Post at A11 (Feb. 1 2005).

Promoting successful democracy as a rapid development will have two detrimental effects. First, it will initially gain political support for the intervening country citizens that wish to see a peaceful Middle East. Once this short-run expectation proves unfounded, support will wane as costs and commitments mount. Second, the citizens of the host country may also be convinced that democracy will bring them the rapid benefits and growth seen in post-World War II Europe, South Asia, or other successful democratic transitions. When these benefits fail to materialize quickly, dissatisfaction with the intervener will grow and retaliation is a likely response.

Democracy must be promoted as a long-term, slow-growth process with no expectation of yielding significant economic returns in the short-run. Peace and stability will result from the strengthening of institutions, independence of the judiciary, and effective administration of the government. Rule of law, regulatory reform and educational investment, as well as other necessary sustainability factors, do not spontaneously occur out of elections or a constitution; they require long-term capital investments and internal collaboration with minority and majority parties.

Democracies with nascent or transitional democratic structures, such as those in Latin America, are facing significant challenges to their sustainability where immediate anticipated benefits are elusive. The long process of democratization, much like that of economic development, is a fragile, nurture-dependent process that yields limited returns, if any, in each of its formative years. Arguing democracy as the basis for intervention, the solution to violent insurgency, and the goal for peace, is unrealistic and dangerous as a public policy.

Democracy can work in the Middle East. But it cannot take root in infertile soil. Democracies tend to promote values that do not coincide with those found in most Middle

Eastern States. For example, freedom of speech and religion, separation of church and state, right to privacy, self-determination, and equal rights. These are fundamental democratic values that have no history in the Middle East.⁶⁹ But this is not to say that they cannot be sown.

“Preconditions matter a great deal for the survivability of democracy but not for the transition to it.”⁷⁰ Democratization throughout the developing world has succeeded where reform efforts began by developing the capacity to sustain an open, heterogeneous society. Institutions must be established to guide the transition to democratic rule.⁷¹ Forceful intervention followed by coercive democratization tactics rather than collaboration with the governments of the Middle East solidifies an image of the U.S. as an imperialist power, not recognizing the unique needs and goals of each society.⁷²

Democracy-building takes time. Free elections and a draft constitution are a small step in the right direction; however, the steps that should have preceded these events are largely absent. As a result, approaches toward democracy in Iraq, for example, are leading to increased separatist inclinations, which have existed since the unification of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul,⁷³ and which seem unlikely to cease in the near future.

b. Economic Growth and Sustainability

The values promoted by democracies stand on one side of a river and those of Islamic regimes stand on the other. The bridge connecting the two is paved with effective development

⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch article on the Middle East.

⁷⁰ *Karl* at 11 (emphasizing the need to address human agency and the strategic calculations of actors to promote sustainable democracy).

⁷¹ See, e.g., Steven Cook, 84 For. Aff. (suggesting that democracy did not take hold in the Arab world due to the existence of flawed institutions).

⁷² See, e.g., Ibrahim M. Oweiss, *Egyptian Example Shows Need for Homegrown Democratization in the Middle East*, 24 Wash. Rep. on Middle East Aff. 34 (April 2005).

⁷³ Zakaria contends that “the end of the old order [in Iraq] has produced growing tendencies toward separatism and intolerance.” Fareed Zakaria, *What Bush Got Right*, Newsweek, Vol. 145 Iss. 11 (Mar. 14, 2005).

policies. This section will describe effective development policies and explain how they will lead to democracy in the Middle East.

Democratization was most broadly promoted by the U.S. in the Wilsonian era as an effort to modernize nations and establish a global community of like-minded politicians.⁷⁴ The utopian goal was the establishment of a peaceful trading community wherein all countries could leverage their competitive advantage for the greater good of the world. The basic theory postulates that the suspected key factors of democracy, including free elections, free press, and legitimate constitutions, were essential to grow economies and thus to develop the market for goods and services that the world needs. While this theory appears logical, data suggests that there is in fact a weak correlation between democratization and development, and likewise between open markets and growth.

Although Wilson was unsuccessful in achieving a world of peaceful trading nations as he had envisioned, several of his successors have made efforts to complete the task including, of recent note, George W. Bush. The Bush Administration invaded Afghanistan with the support of the United Nations Security Council and with the intention of pursuing those responsible for the September 11 bombings in the United States. A collateral effect of their invasion was the removal of the Taliban government. Once it became clear that the United States would be unable to capture the alleged aggressors, they moved into the political arena and began to foster democratization in Afghanistan. Three years later, the result is a country quickly falling into civil war, ripe with corruption and crime.⁷⁵ The efforts at democratization have been unable to secure sustainable development of the country. In Iraq, the story is more disheartening for

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, *International Relations as a Social Science: Rigor and Relevance*, 600 *Annals* 136, 142 (July 2005). See also, Jean Bethke Elshtain, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*, 546 *Annals* 157 (July 1996).

⁷⁵ FN

democracy. With every step toward political stabilization, retaliation grows more fierce. Why did efforts fail in Afghanistan and Iraq after witnessing the great success of post-World War II Germany and Japan under the Marshall Plan? Why is democracy promotion in the Middle East yielding such unremarkable results?

The argument that democracy is essential for economic growth, prevalent since at least the late 20th century, can be derided with one simple word: China. But this is not the only word – Vietnam, Equatorial Guinea, Cambodia – all countries designated either partly or completely not free by Freedom House and joining fifteen more of the top twenty countries in terms of annual GDP growth in the last ten years (see Table 5). These cases of non-democratic economic growth challenge the assumption that democracy is essential for economic development. This type of “extraordinary success has presented a serious problem for those arguing that democracy is necessary for development or that dictatorial regimes cannot produce sustained economic development.”⁷⁶

⁷⁶ THOMAS CAROTHERS, *DEMOCRACY’S SOBERING STATE* (Carnegie Endowment) (2004).

Table 5: Annual GDP Growth (%) for twenty top performing countries⁷⁷

Country Name	Freedom House Ranking (2005) ⁷⁸	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	10-Year Average
Equatorial Guinea	Not Free	14.26	29.14	71.19	21.91	41.45	1.47	1.45	17.62	14.70	9.98	22.32
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Partly Free	20.80	85.90	36.60	15.60	9.60	5.60	4.50	3.90	2.70	4.70	18.99
Liberia	Partly Free	-4.27	12.12	106.28	29.70	22.90	20.40	4.90	3.30	31.00	2.00	16.63
Rwanda	Not Free	35.22	12.75	13.85	8.86	7.58	5.97	6.72	9.38	0.96	3.66	10.50
Turkmenistan	Not Free	-7.20	-6.70	-11.30	6.70	16.46	18.59	20.43	19.83	16.92	17.00	9.07
China	Not Free	10.50	9.60	8.80	7.80	7.10	8.00	7.50	8.30	9.30	9.50	8.64
Myanmar	Not Free	6.95	6.44	5.65	5.87	10.95	13.75	9.70	8.47
Ireland	Free	9.86	8.07	11.09	8.64	11.28	10.08	6.19	6.92	3.70	4.90	8.07
Armenia	Partly Free	6.90	5.87	3.32	7.34	3.30	6.00	9.56	13.19	13.91	10.10	7.95
Mozambique	Partly Free	4.30	7.10	11.10	12.63	7.54	1.52	13.00	7.40	7.10	7.76	7.95
Maldives	Not Free	..	8.82	11.52	9.30	7.78	4.39	3.26	6.08	8.40	8.80	7.59
Angola	Not Free	10.40	11.20	7.90	6.80	3.24	3.01	3.14	14.35	3.45	11.21	7.47
Chad	Not Free	0.81	2.40	4.30	5.90	-0.60	-0.60	9.90	9.90	11.30	31.00	7.43
Vietnam	Not Free	9.54	9.34	8.15	5.76	4.77	6.79	6.89	7.04	7.24	7.50	7.30
Uganda	Partly Free	11.52	9.07	5.10	4.91	7.88	5.38	6.10	6.84	4.73	5.73	6.73
Azerbaijan	Not Free	11.80	1.30	5.80	10.00	7.40	11.10	9.90	10.55	11.20	11.20	6.67
Bhutan	Not Free	6.84	5.49	7.78	7.07	7.00	7.00	7.00	6.68	6.70	4.90	6.65
Cambodia	Not Free	6.89	4.97	6.82	3.68	11.17	6.99	5.56	5.47	5.35	6.00	6.29
Albania	Partly Free	8.90	9.10	-10.20	12.70	10.10	7.30	7.60	4.70	6.00	6.20	6.24
Georgia	Partly Free	2.60	11.20	10.52	3.10	2.88	1.83	4.79	5.48	11.09	8.51	6.20

To yield economic growth and to pave the way for democratic reform, sustainable development must be at the top of developing country agendas. This involves more than fundamental economic growth – it includes essential types of capital that push economies from agrarian or industrial-based towards efficient, knowledge-based economies. With a sufficient concentration of these essential forms of capital, a democratic base begins to form upon which international institutions can more effectively promote democratic growth.

Key indicators of effective sustainable development as suggested by the World Bank include the following: 1) Financial Capital; 2) Physical Capital; 3) Human Capital; 4) Social

⁷⁷ Data from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. Note that while many of developing countries exhibit a rise in annual GDP, income per capita has fallen as a result of higher rates of population growth.

⁷⁸ Data from *Freedom in the World 2005: Table of Independent Countries*, Freedom House, available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/table2005.pdf>.

Capital; and, 5) Natural Capital.⁷⁹ Together, these indicators comprise the base of any society on its way to achieving sustainability and eventual democracy. Development programs that fail to address these basic elements are less likely to successfully achieve sustainable development and to lay the foundation for democratic growth.

Recent sustainable development reports suggest that successful development programs involve a “portfolio of assets”.⁸⁰ Financial capital is an indicator of macroeconomic planning and fiscal management,⁸¹ while raw labor, social and human capital, and the quality of institutions are considered intangible capital.⁸² Intangible capital is a measure that captures assets that are not recorded in standard wealth estimates, offering new insights into the inequalities between developing and developed countries. “For example, if an economy has a very efficient judicial system, clear property rights, and an effective government, the effects will be a higher total wealth and thus, an increase in the intangible capital residual.”⁸³

In order for developing countries to invest in capital growth for sustainable development, excess income in the form of savings must be generated. Savings rates vary across countries, but they are most indicative of development in low-income countries. They are also significantly tied to macroeconomic policy, which can affect the ability to generate and protect income in the form of savings and to invest in intangible capital, such as education. Savings rates as a portion of GDP are shown in Table 6 below.

⁷⁹ SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (World Bank, *available at* <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/EXTESDNETWORK/0,,contentMDK:20502659~menuPK:1287775~pagePK:64159605~piPK:64157667~theSitePK:481161,00.html>).

⁸⁰ WHERE IS THE WEALTH OF NATIONS: MEASURING CAPITAL FOR THE XXI CENTURY (World Bank, Conference Edition, July 15, 2005).

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² *Id.* at 17.

⁸³ *Id.* at 101.

TABLE 6a: Savings Rates (top ten and bottom ten)⁸⁴

Country Name	10-Year Average	Country Name	10-Year Average
Macao, China	50.09%	Lebanon	-10.27%
Singapore	48.80%	Cape Verde	-12.04%
Maldives	46.63%	Sao Tome and Principe	-13.57%
Gabon	44.78%	Bosnia and Herzegovina	-13.63%
Congo, Rep.	43.96%	Afghanistan	-16.33%
Malaysia	43.92%	West Bank and Gaza	-23.20%
China	42.85%	Tonga	-23.29%
Botswana	39.42%	Lesotho	-27.71%
East Asia & Pacific	38.79%	Timor-Leste	-36.67%
Luxembourg	38.48%	Eritrea	-37.43%

TABLE 6b: Savings Rates by Region

Region	10-Year Average
Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC)	11.32%
Least developed countries: UN classification	11.48%
Sub-Saharan Africa	17.14%
Low income	19.05%
Latin America & Caribbean	20.20%
South Asia	20.43%
High income: OECD	21.32%
High income	21.61%
Europe & Central Asia	21.65%
Middle East & North Africa	21.99%
Upper middle income	22.63%
European Monetary Union	22.66%
Low & middle income	25.37%
Middle income	26.42%
High income: non-OECD	29.02%
Lower middle income	29.26%
East Asia & Pacific	38.79%

⁸⁴ Data from World Development Indicators, World Bank. Note that some savings rates are negative, reflective excess government spending.

Table 6b is particularly telling of the low social capital available within the Middle East. Wide dispersions of wealth in the region prohibit the equal access to education seen in Asian and European regions. Combining this limited educational investment with an anticipated substantial rise in a young population throughout the Middle East⁸⁵ could lead to a reversal in the development progress made thus far.

The primary assets of intangible capital are human capital (the skills and knowledge of the labor force), social capital (trust of the people in a society) and governance (efficient judicial system, property rights and an effective government).⁸⁶ With these factors at the forefront of development projects, sustaining growth becomes an achievable task.

According to the World Bank, intangible capital accounts for roughly 75% of the world's total wealth.⁸⁷ Developing countries that face high poverty and unemployment are more likely to have low intangible capital – less technology investment, more capital flight and more emigration of the educated citizenry. The result is a country that cannot sustain growth and provide for the basic needs of its people.

Economic stability and growth are fundamental requirements for sustainable democracy. As described above, democracy requires the establishment of solid institutions, social capital, and cultural coalition building. Democracy is unsustainable in countries that lack significant intangible capital, maintain high poverty and low growth rates, and have insignificant savings rates to invest in capital growth.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ FN on ME pop. Growth.

⁸⁶ *Supra* n. 3 at 110-11.

⁸⁷ See Where is the Wealth of Nations at 24.

⁸⁸ See, e.g., Benjamin and Simon, at 200 (finding that democracy is a good plan for the Middle East but that it is unsustainable unless substantial reforms are undertaken first).

VI. *Conclusion: Recalibrating the War to Avoid Promoting Terrorism Instead of Development*

“[I]n the case of the United States, the threat to the State comes not from terrorism, but the response to terrorism.”⁸⁹ Whether the pretext for the U.S.-led war on terror in the Middle East was the pursuit of terrorists or preventive warfare, the result has been an attempt at forced democratization. The question that policymakers should be asking is whether this effort is having an effect on terrorist proliferation and, if so, whether that effect is positive. The signs that terrorist activity in democratic countries is increasing are evident, but is there a correlation between this increasing activity and current democratization efforts?

The data presented in this paper indicates that there is a positive correlation between Western efforts to forcefully democratize the Middle East and the level of terrorist activity against foreign targets. In addition, the literature suggests that there is a weak linkage between democracy and rapid economic development and peace. From these findings, the following conclusions can be drawn.

The lack of preparation for going to war with Iraq and Afghanistan has been hotly debated and extensively analyzed. However, more important for this discussion is the lack of preparation for sustaining a peaceful transition process from authoritarian regimes to democracies in these countries. No plan for continued support and development other than establishing symbolic democratic mechanisms was established prior to engaging in the regime change process. The work of the United States in rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II involved “several years of intensive advance planning...and training of key administrators, both military and civilian, with the organisation ready to be put in place

⁸⁹ Arunabha Bhoomik, *Democratic Responses to Terrorism: A Comparative Study of the United States, Israel, and India*, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 309 (2005). See also, B.H. Bourdillon, *The Political Situation in Iraq*, 3 J. OF BRIT. INST. OF INT’L AFF. 6 (Nov. 1924)

immediately [after] the surrenders of the defeated states had been made.”⁹⁰ This planning is largely absent from the present plan in the Middle East.

The spread of democratic political and economic values to the developing world should focus on fostering institutions, not political parties. Alex Seita claims that globalization should be configured to promote the values of liberal democracy and that Western democracies should “be able to determine the specific content of globalization.” However, he warns that the perception of the West as political and economic imperialists will not foster support for democratizing efforts. Thus, the “primary vehicle for the industrialized democracies should be the “rule of law”.”⁹¹

A key area of concern for terrorist proliferation is failed states. Crumbling democracies or those that could not get off the ground, weak autocracies that are run by interest groups, and governments too weak to provide basic social services are prime havens for terrorist growth and development.⁹² Some recognition of this fact has led the Bush Administration to begin training more troops in Africa to fight the rising locus operandi of terrorist groups.⁹³ However, taking regime change from one State to another without completing the implementation of effective measures to sustain growth and development leaves the door open for a resurgence of terrorist activity. Afghanistan is a prime example. After the 2001 destruction of the Taliban ruling party, the U.S. declared victory and moved on to Iraq. This short-sightedness has led to deterioration of security in the country and the rise of more Taliban forces.⁹⁴ The citizens of Afghanistan

⁹⁰ EDWARD MCWHINNEY, *THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST ATTACKS AND THE INVASION OF IRAQ IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: OPINIONS ON THE EMERGING NEW WORLD ORDER SYSTEM* (2004).

⁹¹ Alex Seita, *Globalization and the Convergence of Values*, 30 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 429, 431-32 (1997).

⁹² See Douglas Farah, *Standing by as a Brutal Warlord Plots His Return*, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 2005, at B03, Mohamed Osman, *African States Discuss How to Fight Terrorism*, The Assoc. Press, Sept. 21, 2005.

⁹³ See Bob Edwards, *United States Increasing Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa*, Nat’l Pub. Radio, March 8, 2004.

⁹⁴ See, e.g., *Gunmen Kill Candidate in Sunday’s Afghan Elections*, Wash. Post, Sept. 17, 2005, at A17.

“remain desperately poor and essentially ungoverned, scarcely better off then they were on September 11, 2001.”⁹⁵

Forced democratization of a developing country followed by minimal sustainable development practices will not achieve any reduction in overall terrorist activity and in fact may make the world a less safe place in which to live. What is needed to achieve success in the democratization process for the Middle East is collaborative, effective and sustainable development practices. Leadership of this process must come from inside the Middle East, rather than from foreign imposition.⁹⁶ A recent article in the Middle East Journal eloquently stated this process as follows: “Development depends on a political version of bio-diversity, in which democracy emerges organically out of existing local traditions and practices.”⁹⁷

Stephen Cook, Director of the Council of Foreign Relations’ Independent Task Force report, *In Support of Arab Democracy: Why and How?*, concluded that “it’s better to promote democracy and manage [the risk that unfriendly governments will result] than to do nothing and continue to face the same kinds of problems in the region that we currently face: political alienation, extremism, and, ultimately, terrorism.”⁹⁸ He also suggests that one way in which the U.S. can promote democracy in the region is by linking political reform to aid. In this way, “[w]e can actually reward countries with aid if they do the right thing on political reform.”⁹⁹

Cook does not address the possibility that there is an alternative to forced democratization that may result in long-term stability and significantly less loss of life. Effective development offers a solution that can provide a remedy to terrorist proliferation, a collaborative

⁹⁵ *Stern* at 294. (concluding that Iraq is quite the same situation.)

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Ibrahim M. Oweiss, *Egyptian Example Shows Need for Homegrown Democratization in the Middle East*, Wash. Rep. on Middle East Aff., Vol. 24 No. 3 at 34 (Apr. 2005).

⁹⁷ Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, *Democratic Development in Oman*, 59 Middle Eastern J. 376 (Summer 2005).

⁹⁸ Interview with Stephen A. Cook (Council on Foreign Relations) (June 9, 2005).

⁹⁹ *Id.*

institutional growth approach, and eventually, organically developed democracy. Ignoring this solution is detrimental to development and peace in the region and worldwide. Tying aid to political reform, much like the new U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation is doing,¹⁰⁰ prevents effective development from taking hold in a country by ignoring several long-term institutional growth processes necessary to sustain democracy.¹⁰¹ In essence, with aid tied to political reform, growth will be limited by the amount of real and superficial external changes a country is able to make, without paying heed to the key institutional development and other key reforms that the country should make. Countries may focus their efforts on satisfying the demands of Western grant-making institutions' ideas of political reform at the expense of some of the most critical internal developmental reforms.

One might conclude from reading this paper that there remains no workable solution to the war on terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet while this text is intended to congeal ideas about the best way to promote democracy in the Middle East from this point forward, there are still options remaining for Iraq and Afghanistan worthy of brief mention.

The U.S. has placed itself in a very uncompromising position. If they leave troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to root out terrorists and facilitate electoral politics, violence will worsen in retaliation to the imperial occupation, and fatalities and costs will continue to rise. If the U.S. pulls troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan, a power vacuum will emerge and either civil war will break out or extremist factions will take power, reversing the limited progress that has been made to this point.¹⁰² Additionally, the idea that the war on terror may be leading to an increase in the

¹⁰⁰ See THE OTHER WAR: GLOBAL POVERTY AND THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT (Carol Graham et al. eds. 2003).

¹⁰¹ See Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building*, at 37 ("The MCA [Millennium Challenge Account] may stimulate countries well on the road to reform, but it will do little for failed states and the world's more troubled countries.")

¹⁰² See, e.g., Andrew F. Krepinevich, *How to Win in Iraq*, For. Aff. (Sept./Oct. 2005).

number of terrorist attacks has begun to grow in support by Americans, reflecting the need for policy support at home as well as abroad.¹⁰³

To resolve this quagmire, several steps must be taken. First, global support must be sought. The U.S. is the primary occupying force in both Iraq and Afghanistan and entered Iraq without justification in international law. The occupation has already cost nearly \$300 billion and thousands of Iraqi and American lives. Working together with committed, well-funded international partners will have two effects – it will substantially reduce the costs borne by the U.S. and increase the coverage of protective forces, and it will simultaneously reduce the image that America is the sole imperial power in the region. Garnering international support at this point will be difficult and it will involve significant bargaining on the part of U.S. diplomats. In order for the international community to get on board, the U.S. strategy in the region must change and collaboration with the UN must increase.

Rather than pursuing a policy of military dominance over extremist elements, the image of the U.S. military in the region should shift to one of development protection. The institutional development that needs to take place – laws, a viable constitution, an independent judiciary – requires support and protection. The structures required to build social capital, a key development indicator, require support – for instance, building schools, including trade schools and Universities, and protecting students as they pursue training and education in these schools. Also, jobs need to be created, employing the masses and providing regularized salaries for potential sympathizers to extremist elements.¹⁰⁴ These must not be subsidiary role of the U.S.-

¹⁰³ According to a Roper Center 2005 survey, 41% of surveyed Americans thought that the war in Iraq has led to an increase in the risk of further terrorist attacks in the U.S. The Roper Center Public Opinion Matters, (Oct. 2005) available at <http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/cgi-bin/hsrun.exe/roperweb/pom/pom.htx;start=ipollsearch?TopID=293>.

¹⁰⁴ Over the next 15 years, population growth in the region will require the addition of approximately 100 million new jobs. See Ray Takeyh, *Close, but no Democracy*, The National Interest (Winter 2004/05).

led forces, but primary ones. Failed efforts to build sustainable institutions can substantially deride support for democracy in the region.¹⁰⁵ The growing sentiment throughout the Middle East is that the U.S. is not sincerely interested in democratic reform.¹⁰⁶ This shift in strategy toward enhancing development will encourage long-term growth, ensure local collaboration, and engage international support.

Finally, immediate attention must be given to long-term sustainable development in the Middle East and Africa. These two regions are the poorest, most underdeveloped in the world and they have shown themselves to be economically, politically and socially incapable of meeting the needs of their citizens. The result has been either Middle Eastern puppet-governments with little domestic legitimacy, or corrupt, militaristic African polities. The U.S. is the most prominent actor in the Middle East and thus is a primary target of terrorist attacks against the West. Accordingly, it is in the best interests of the American people for the U.S. to pursue a policy of preventive development – bring the growth and peace to the people before they bring the war and hatred to America.

“Democracy is the worst form of government except for all those others that have been tried.”¹⁰⁷ Winston Churchill saw the drawbacks of democratic rule but recognized that it is the most workable system of our time. Promoting democratic values is wise foreign policy for democratic countries. What needs to be remembered, however, is that democratic values alone do not bring growth, peace or sustainability. Promoting democracy must involve a substantial component of promoting development. When key development indicators fail, democracy will fail. Democracy has been advocated as the bringer of many goods – rapid economic growth,

¹⁰⁵ Joe Stephens and David B. Ottoway, A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks, Wash. Post (Nov. 20, 2005) at A01 (discussing the deteriorating structures and institutions in Afghanistan that were rushed to completion by the U.S. prior to national elections).

¹⁰⁶ See Benjamin at 53.

¹⁰⁷ Winston Churchill, Address to the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947).

market development, free and fair elections, equality – yet where these deliverables fall short, support for democracies wanes and alternative political and economic solutions are sought. Without successful sustainable development practices and long-term implementation horizons, democratic progress cannot be sustained.